The combinatorics of classical propositional logic lies at the heart of both local and global methods of proof search due to the possibility to achieve least-commitment search. Extension of such methods to the predicate calculus, or to non-classical systems, presents us with the problem of recovering this least-commitment principle in the context of non-invertible rules. One successful approach is to view the nonclassical logic as a perturbation on search in classical logic and characterize when a least-commitment (classical) search yields su cient evidence for provability in the (non-classical) logic. This technique has been successfully applied to both local and global methods at the cost of subsidiary searches and is the analogue of the standard treatment of quanti ers via skolemization and uni cation.
Introduction 1.Classical propositional logic and proof-search
The peculiar combinatorial properties of classical propositional logic (CPL) are of general signi cance for automated deduction far beyond interest in simple (classical) propositional theorems might suggest. Both global methods (e.g., the inverse method or resolution) and local methods (e.g., Gentzen systems and tableaux) achieve an ideal form when applied to CPL. For the former, the Conjunctive Normal Form Theorem supports a considerable degree of localization, with search spaces made up of sets of derived units (clauses) each of which may be considered independently of the others. For the latter, the search spaces generated by extension of derivation trees can be signi cantly reduced using congruences arising from rule permutations to produce improved tableaux methods or methods based on path-checking algorithms (e.g., connection methods). These applications re ect two sides of the same coin, the duality being expressed most elegantly by Gentzen's Hauptsatz for LK 6] which yields refutational completeness for the cut rule with sequent theories as axioms, and direct completeness for the cut-free fragment of LK.
Quanti ers and non-classical logics
The addition of quanti ers to CPL to form the predicate calculus (CPC) brings problems with non-invertible rules (eigenvariable conditions) and the consequent limitation on the permutation congruence. Herbrand's Theorem 9], Gentzen's Mid-Sequent Theorem 6], Smullyan's Fundamental Theorem 31] and the Prenex Normal Form Theorem, can be used to limit the impact of the non-invertible rules and to retain the structure of the propositional search space. The cost is the superposition of the uni cation search space and Skolemization, or their equivalents.
For certain regular non-classical logics, such as normal modal logics and intuitionistic logic, non-invertible rules are already present in propositional systems. Nevertheless, a view can be developed of these logics in which search involving the non-classical connectives is seen essentially as a perturbation on classical search, by analogy with the predicate calculus. This view has been expressed as a \matrix characterization" by Wallen 34] , and rendered in local form by Ohlbach 17] , and in global form by authors such as Otten and Kreitz 18] . Metatheorems of this kind have even been developed for a predicative type theory by Pym and Wallen 23, 26 ]. An analysis of the quanti ers in is not included on this occasion.
Classical logic as the basic search-calculus
These observations and results have led us to the view that CPL plays a pivotal role in search calculi. Or, to put it more programmatically, that CPL expresses the logic of least-commitment search: the ideal for any complex search problem. Reduction to this ideal, perhaps with the superposition of subsidiary search spaces to account for the irregularities of non-classical and non-propositional connectives, might usefully be considered as the goal of (theoretical e orts in) automated deduction when faced with a new formalism.
For modal, and to some extent intuitionistic, systems this reduction can be seen as being semantically motivated (e.g., 17]), in much the same way that it is easier to think in terms of \G odel-Skolem" than \Herbrand" when motivating the syntactic transformations involved in Skolemization and uni cation. Such a view has pragmatic, and certainly pedagogical force, but threatens to leave important factors out of the analysis relating to the ne-structure of search spaces; for example, questions of decidability and optimality are but two that come to mind concerning the role of contraction.
Classical logic as a type-theoretic formalism
In order to seek a perspective from which to understand how search in a logic may be viewed proof-theoretically as a perturbation on search in classical propositional logic, we develop below a treatment of classical logic as a type theory, in which the types are LK derivations. Objects, de ned in suitable system, inhabit, or realize, the LK derivations and serve to capture the basic congruences at work in the search space (typically, permutation of rules and reduction of implicit cuts).
The basic language of realizers is provided by (simple extensions of) Parigot's -calculus 19, 20, 21] . However, the treatment of disjunction in this setting is a delicate matter. We distinguish two formulations, + and _.
The former is derived from the single-conclusioned form of the intuitionistic calculus LJ, +I ?` i ; ?` 1 + 2 ; (i = 1; 2)
Realizers for this disjunction are given by the usual terms for sums in the -calculus. The latter exploits the multiple-conclusioned form of LK, _I ?` 1 ; 2 ; ?` 1 _ 2 ; :
In this form the principal formula of the conclusion is composed of two formulae from the antecedent of the premiss. In the sequel, we show that it follows that if we are to obtain directly a system of realizers for _, we must add second binding operator, , to perform this composition. We call the extended calculus . From the point of view of logical consequence the two formulations are equivalent, being interderivable via weakening. However, from the computational perspective of proof-search, they are very di erent. The failure of the subformula property forces a non-deterministic choice between 1 and 2 when using the former as a reduction operator, while the latter forces no such choice.
The realizers play two roles in the sequel: initially, to permit axiomatization of the perturbation which yields the non-classical search space; subsequently, to allow such perturbations to be related. Proof-theoretically, using classical predicate calculus as a guide for terminology, we seek generalized Herbrand results. Semantically, we seek an explanation of the force of the myriad of syntactic tricks developed to embed non-classical logics in the classical propositional system.
Overview of the paper
In this paper we develop the basic type-theoretic results and show how to axiomatize the perturbation which results in intuitionistic logic and present an application.
In x 2, we review the idea of proof-objects/realizers, and develop a suitable set of realizers for classical logic by extending the -calculus of Parigot 19] . This involves extending successively by conjunctive types, then disjunctive types, and nally by explicit substitution. While the addition of conjunctive types is straightforward, the disjunctive case is, as we have seen, more delicate. We explain how our intention to model search and not just proof motivates our choice of the LK-like version _ in preference to the LJlike version + and why this choice requires to be used as the language of realizers. The addition of explicit substitution to form is required for a proper search-based treatment of implication. For each of these calculi, we establish the requisite proof-theoretic properties of strong normalization and con uence.
x 3 is devoted to the axiomatization of search in intuitionistic logic as a perturbation on the base classical system. This takes the form of a condition on a classical realizer which indicates (the existence of) an intuitionistic derivation of the classically derived endsequent. This condition is the equivalent of the admissibility condition on pre x uni ers in 34], but formulated in a more direct form.
In x 4, we consider an application of the results to (hereditary Harrop) analytic resolution. Type-theoretically, this involves considering -expanded forms of the realizers.
A semantic (category-theoretic) view of has been developed to support further analysis. This will be presented by some of us (Pym and Ritter) elsewhere. An application of the results to intuitionistic and classical resolution has been developed in 29] . A preliminary version of the work presented herein for the fragment of intuitionistic propositional logic without negation or disjunction can be found in 28].
2 Proof-objects and -calculus 2.1 Proof-objects and realizers For propositional intuitionistic ( ; :;^; +)-logic, proofs of a sequent ? ! A, within a single-conclusioned calculus of sequents LJ, can be interpreted as constructions of natural deductions of the succedent formula A from the antecedent formulae in ? 35, 22, 1] . Such a natural deduction can be seen as a proof-object realizing (i.e., providing evidence for) the consequence ?` A. describes how to obtain natural deduction proofs of A from natural deduction proofs of the formulae in ?.
In propositional intuitionistic ( ; :;^; +)-logic, the relationship between the proof-object and the formulae in ? ?! A is particularly intimate. This correspondence, between natural deduction proofs and -terms on the one hand and propositions and types on the other, does not hold for classical natural deduction. However, Parigot's -calculus 19] provides an elegant language of proof-objects based on an algorithmic interpretation of classical sequent calculus provided by cut-elimination. The proof-objects are realizers for multiple-conclusioned sequents ? ?! A; , where A is a distinguished, or active, formula. -terms provide combinatorial evidence for the existence of classical sequent derivations.
The -calculus
We begin by introducing a minor variation on Parigot's -calculus 19]. In addition to implicational types, we include conjunctive types. We proceed to add disjunctive types and then explicit substitutions uft=xg. The last are used in the analysis of search below to give suitable representatives for possibly incompletable sequent derivations. Parigot presents in 19] only a -calculus with implicational types and -reductions. The addition of conjunctive types is straightforward, but the addition of disjunctive types is more problematic as there are two main alternatives which we will brie y discuss below. To model the transition from a given proof to a uniform proof we also need -expansions. We show that strong normalization and con uence still hold for this extended calculus but the reducibility proof needs careful reworking as the -expansions give rise to additional reduction rules.
We present this calculus in four steps: rstly, we introduce thecalculus with implicational types, conjunctive types and -reductions. Secondly, we add disjunctive types and, thirdly, we add -expansion and prove strong normalization and con uence for this system. Finally, we add explicit substitutions, showing that normalization and con uence are preserved.
Implication and conjunction
The raw terms of the -calculus with conjunction are given by the following grammar:
t ::= x j x: A : t j tt j :t j ]t j ?:t j ?]t j ht; ti j (t) j 0 (t):
We assume that the scope of the bracket operator ]t extends as far to the right as possible, i.e., the term ]ts is implicitly bracketed as ](ts). The rules for well-formed terms are as follows:
? 
and de ned on all other expressions by pushing the replacement inside.
There are three kinds of reduction rules: and -rules, which are familiar from the -calculus, and -rules. The -rules model commuting conversions: they shift the logical left-rules upwards in the proof tree. The -calculus provides an account of classical free deduction, which is natural deduction extended to multi-conclusioned sequents: i.e., the terms are realizers for a calculus in which multiple-conclusioned sequents can be derived without impure constraints 2]. Consequently, the form of the typing judgment in the -calculus is ?`t : A ; , where ? is a context familiar from the typed -calculus and is a context containing types indexed by names, ; ; : : : , which are distinct from variables. The idea is that each -sequent has exactly one principal formula, A, on the right-hand side, the leftmost one, which is the formula upon which all introduction and elimination rules operate. This formula is the type of the term t. (2) This formulation is the more desirable as a basis for proof-search because it maintains a local representation of the global choice between A 1 and A 2 .
Given a local representation, we can hope to avoid backtracking to this point in the search space. In particular, this form of disjunction can be exploited to improve the e ciency of certain formulations of logic programming.
For the -calculus, this latter formulation presents a new di culty.
Suppose the -sequent ?`t: A; B ; is to be the premiss of the _I rule.
In forming the disjunctive active formula A_B, we move the named formula B from the context to the active position. Consequently, _I is formulated as a binding operation on names and we introduce the following additional constructs, to form the grammar of -terms:
t ::= h it j : t:
The term : t introduces a disjunction and the term h it eliminates one. To avoid variable capture, we have to add a special clause for the mixed substitution:
where is a fresh name. If we had pushed the substitution through, Indeed, the imposition of such a bijection forces that, for every ?, , t and A, ft j ?`t : A; is provableg have at most one element. The proper formulation of this result requires sophisticated semantic techniques and will be presented by some of us (Pym and Ritter) elsewhere.
-rules, strong normalization and con uence
Parigot gives only reduction rules for -reduction. For modelling uniform proofs, we need also extensionality, i.e., we must have the -rules. We introduce them here as expansions, meaning that each term of functional type is transformed into a -abstraction, each term of product type into a product and each term of sum type into a term :t 0 . These rules are t ; x: A:tx ^t ; h (t); 0 (t)i _ t ; :h it In these rules, we assume that t is neither a -abstraction nor a product nor a term :t 0 nor t does not occur as the rst argument of an application, of a projection or 0 or of some term h i . In the -, ^-and _ -rules, we also assume that t is of function type, product type and sum type respectively. (4) Note that this reduction rule specializes to the rule if is a name of atomic type. Because the outermost bindings : of names of atomic type disappear by an application of the -rule, this rule cannot give rise to reduction sequences t ; t. Logically, the -rule amounts to taking a right-rule and moving it above a structural rule (i.e., weakening, contraction) applied to its principal formula.
Our rst lemma gives the local con uence of , extending Parigot's result for 20].
Lemma 2. The notion of reduction in the -calculus is locally con uent.
Proof. We show that all critical pairs can be completed. For critical pairs arising from the rules , and this is part of the con uence of Parigot's -calculus. We show only a few characteristic cases for the rule (4 The second case we consider is the overlap of the -rule with theexpansion. This is the case which gives rise to the additional reduction rule . For this, consider the term w = ] :t, which can be reduced via the -rule to t. The reduction sequence via the rule is as follows: which is t modulo some -expansions and/or -reductions.
The choice of a distinguished formula on the right-hand side of the sequent is required to ensure strong normalization and con uence. We use Parigot's proof 21] and extend it to the conjunctive and disjunctive types and explicit substitution.
We now give the proof of strong normalization for . We extend the result to include explicit substitutions in x 2. yields an in nite reduction sequence for an element of cl m (t), which is SN by the induction hypothesis (S1).
The key theorem states that every term is reducible. For this we need a generalized induction hypothesis which includes all possible substitutions of reducible terms for free variables and all mixed substitutions for free names. Mixed substitutions arise as contracta of the -rules in the same way as the ordinary substitution arises as a contractum of the -rule. Finally, we obtain the desired result as a corollary.
Corollary 6. All well-typed -terms are SN.
Now we are in a position to deduce con uence from local con uence and termination via Newman's Lemma 13].
Theorem 7. The -calculus is con uent.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Newman's Lemma 13] , which states that a locally con uent and terminating notion of reduction is con uent.
Explicit substitution: the -calculus
Our nal extension of the -calculus involves adding a form of explicit substitution.
The presentation of the -calculus in 19] and of herein is as a system of linearized natural deduction with multiple conclusions, with implicational types both introduced and eliminated on the right-hand side. An alternative formulation of Parigot's system, not a ecting the structure of the derivable terms, would be as a sequent calculus, with the elimination of implicational types on the right replaced by the introduction of implicational types on the left, as follows: -terms are thus -terms enriched by the presence of explicit substitutions. More precisely, the grammar of -terms is the grammar for the -calculus with the added clause t ::= t ft=xg (6) If the substitution were implicit, and so evaluated when introduced, some parts of a derivation would not be represented by the corresponding term. This happens if the variable being replaced does not occur in the term. The rule for explicit substitution L can thus be used to model the L-rule of the classical sequent calculus directly. In 27], a similar analysis is provided for a proof system for SLD-resolution over propositional implicational Horn clauses. Herbelin 10] also uses explicit substitutions, for a similar reason, in his version of a translation of intuitionistic sequent calculus (LJ) into a modi ed -calculus. His concern, however, is to restrict LJ so as obtain a bijective correspondence between -terms and LJ-derivations. Now we extend strong normalization and con uence to the -calculus. Intuitively, these rules push substitutions under all term constructors but do not include the rule x fs=xg ; s, which actually carries out the substitution. con uence. Note also that the rules for explicit substitution distribute substitutions only to variables and allow no interactions between the substitutions themselves. Hence termination is ensured as the execution of substitution rules cannot create any redexes that were not present in the term with all substitutions eliminated. The precise formulation of this idea uses tree-orderings to ensure that non-substitution redexes do not create a possibility of an in nite reduction sequences by copying redexes of substitution rules. The following metatheorems are extended to , as de ned by (5), (6) and (7): Theorem 8. The -calculus is strongly normalizing.
Proof. De ne the height of a term t inductively by h(x) = 0 h( ) = 0 h(C(t)) = h(t) + 1 for any unary term constructor h(C(t 1 ; t 2 )) = max(h(t 1 ); h(t 2 )) + 1:
Now we assign a complexity tree T (t) to each term t. The nodes of the tree are labelled by a pair of natural numbers. The rst number is (t e ), where t e is the term t with all explicit substitutions deleted, and the second number indicates the height of the term t in a subexpression t fu=xg. This tree is inductively de ned as follows:
x: T (x) is the tree which consists only of the root with the label (0; 0); : T ( ) is the tree which consists only of the root with the label (0; 0); C(t): If the root of T (t) is labelled (n; h), then T (C(t)) is the tree T (t) with the label of the root changed to ( (C(t) e ; h); C(t 1 ; t 2 ): T (C(t 1 ; t 2 )) is the tree with the root labelled ( (C(t 1 ; t 2 )) e ; 0) and where the children of the root are the trees T (t 1 ) and T (t 2 ); (t fu=xg): The tree T (t fu=xg) is the tree with the root labelled ( (t e ); h(t)) with children T (t) and T (u).
We order these trees by the tree-ordering: The tree t 1 is smaller than the tree t 2 if any node of t 2 can be mapped to a node of t 1 such that the root of t 2 is greater than the node of t 1 to which it is mapped and that all other nodes of t 2 are mapped to nodes which are not bigger and that a child of a node in t 2 is mapped to some grandchild (including itself) of the image of the parent. The ordering of the nodes is the lexicographic ordering on natural numbers. It is well-known that this tree-ordering is a well-ordering, so for the termination proof it su ces to check that whenever t ; t 0 , the term t is bigger than t 0 in the tree-ordering. First consider any non-substitution reduction t ; t 0 . If the redex which is contracted occurs in a substitution term s, say u fs=xg, then only the subtree T (s) is a ected by the reduction t ; t 0 , so we can assume without loss of generality that the redex which is contracted in t is not a substitution term in t. Hence the rst component of the root T (t) decreases when the redex is contracted. Any substitution term u is una ected by the reduction t ; t 0 . Hence we can use the simple mapping which maps any nodes which correspond to non-substitution terms to the root and maps the subtree corresponding to substitution terms u to the same subtree in T (t). Second, consider any substitution reduction t ; t 0 .
In this case the decrease in the tree-ordering results from the decrease of the second component of the node as the height of the subtree where the substitution occurs decreases. Con uence follows from strong normalization and local con uence, as usual.
Theorem 9. The -calculus is con uent.
Proof. Again, it su ces to check local con uence. Because the -calculus is con uent it su ces to consider only overlaps between explicit substitution rules or an explicit substitution rule and a rule which does not involve explicit substitution. There are no critical pairs in the rst case. For the second case, one has to show a substitution lemma. This lemma states that
Representation of sequent derivations in
In this section, we describe the use of the -calculus to represent sequent proofs. The classical nature of -calculus in uences the way in which it can be used to represent intuitionistic sequent derivations. Hence we begin with some observations about the relationship between intuitionistic and classical sequent derivations.
In general, every intuitionistic derivation arises as a subderivation of a classical derivation. Because the R-rule allows multiple succedents in the premiss, two di erent intuitionistic sequent derivations, which are not identical up to a permutation of inference rules, can be subderivations of the same classical sequent derivation up to a choice of axioms. These two inferences can either be considered to be instances of R in our multipleconclusioned intuitionistic sequent calculus given in Figure 1 where we have attached variables to the antecedents to make it easier to refer to a speci c formula. If rst x is reduced and then y, there is no way of identifying an intuitionistic subderivation. However, if we reduce rst y, and then x, then we obtain an intuitionistic derivation. Both derivations are shown in Figures 4 and 5 respectively (see page 38) .
Below, we show how to formulate a condition on classical derivations to determine when they have intuitionistic subderivations. This is formulated as a condition on a -term that interprets the classical derivation (see De nition 13). Subsequently, we show how transformations on the -terms can be used to characterize the search space over a given endsequent (see Theorem 20) . We prove the completeness of a particular search strategy for classical logic with respect to intuitionistic provability. Again, the formulation of this strategy uses -terms (see Theorem 25).
Translation into
We start by giving the translation from classical sequent derivations into the -calculus. Note that the classical sequent derivations have to be suitably annotated for the de nition. Firstly, each sequent has one principal formula in the succedent together with an arbitrary number of additional formulae. We introduce a name for each additional formula in the succedent and a variable for each formula in the antecedent. Secondly, the translation has to take the explicit exchange rule in the -calculus into account. 
Intuitionistic provability
We consider a sequent calculus presentation of intuitionistic logic with multiple formulae on the right with weakening built into the inference rules, as in 34]. The rules are given in Figure 1 . They are a restriction of the classical sequent calculus in which R and :R are permitted only for, respectively, singleton and empty succedents.
In deciding when a classically derivation indicates that its endsequent is intuitionistically provable, the requirement is to detect super uous infer- We want to be able to detect that the use of the R-rule to reduce the formula D E is super uous by using the -term corresponding to this proof. We can then conclude that there is an intuitionistic proof of this sequent. The name has a non-weakening occurrence in the -abstraction over A;
hence this term is not intuitionistic. Next, we show the correctness of the criterion. The crucial point is that a weakening term corresponds to a super uous subderivation. The following lemma makes this precise. is an intuitionistic -term. The case of the :R-rule is similar.
Representation of uniform proofs
In this subsection and the next, we show that a certain classical proof procedure is sound and complete for intuitionistic provability of sequents of propositional hereditary Harrop formulae. The proof procedure is based on an extension of Miller's notion of uniform proof to multiple-conclusioned systems 15] .
A uniform proof 16] is a sequent derivation in which, when read from root to leaves, all right rules are applied whenever it is possible so to do, except for axioms with non-atomic principal formulae. 2 We call a proof fully uniform if right rules are preferred even over axioms. The notion of a uniform proof leads to a simple, highly deterministic search algorithm:
rst apply all possible right-rules; then select an appropriate left-rule. Note that Miller et al. de ne uniform proofs for the full, single-conclusioned calculus LJ 6] . In this case, not every LJ-provable propositional sequent has a uniform proof. The reason is that it may be necessary to apply the _L-rule before the _R-rule to obtain a proof. As an example in the multiple- The uniform derivation in the multiple-conclusioned calculus cannot be obtained by simply adding the formula D C to all right-hand sides and then applying the multiple-conclusioned _R-rule instead.
We make the relation between the two notions of uniform proof precise at the end of the next subsection, after we have studied the e ect of permutations on classical uniform proofs.
Permutations
The analysis of permutations in proofs is important because there are (wellknown) non-permutabilities in intuitionistic logic. We have seen exam- ( Note that the proof of the theorem also shows the way in which the multipleconclusioned notion of uniform classical proof generalizes the corresponding notion for single-conclusions: each uniform proof in the single-conclusioned sense corresponds to a normal -term, and the above proof shows how to construct a multiple-conclusioned uniform proof from this -term which contains the original proof as a subproof. As an example, take the sequent A; C ?! (B A) _ (D C). One uniform derivation in the singleconclusioned calculus LJ was given on page 30. The construction in the above proof yields exactly the multiple-conclusioned uniform derivation given on page 21.
Application to (hereditary Harrop) analytic resolution
In this section, we apply the above results to an analytic resolution procedure for intuitionistically provable hereditary Harrop formulae based on the L rule. The key point is that in an application of a L-rule to the formula B A, the formula A is always atomic, and hence can be matched with a formula in the succedent. We will show that there is no loss of generality in this restriction which facilitates the search procedure signi cantly.
De nition 21. A sequent derivation is called a resolution derivation if it satis es the following constraints for rule applications:
(i) An^R-rule is applied only if no formula on the right-hand side is a disjunction;
(ii) An R-rule is applied only if no formula on the right-hand side is a conjunction or a disjunction;
(iii) An L-rule, with principal formula G A, is applied only if all formulae on the right-hand side are atomic and A occurs on the right-hand side;
(iv) A^L-rule is applied only if all formulae on the right-hand side are atomic;
(v) An _L-rule is applied only if no formula on the left-hand side is a conjunction. We include condition (iv) only for consistency with the usual de nition 16, 25] . It is inessential for the analysis presented here.
The primary di erence between a fully uniform proof and a resolution proof is the requirement in the latter that the atomic matrix of the principal formula of each L rule match with an atom on the succedent of the conclusion of the rule. Note also that the application of both the left and right rules has to be in a speci ed order | conjunction rst | in the case of the latter.
Lemma 18 implies that if the restricted order in which the right rules are applied does not succeed in obtaining an intuitionistic proof, then no other ordering will. Moreover, resolution proofs are complete for intuitionistic provability of propositional hereditary Harrop formulae. The second step is a lot more complicated to capture. The reason is that the L-rules introduce arbitrarily complex formulae in the succedent: these formulae must be decomposed.
To see the necessity of exchanging L-rules, consider the sequent x : A B; y : (A B) B ?! B :
One possible derivation is given by Figure 4 , in which x is reduced rst.
The derivation in Figure 5 is obtained from the rst one by exchanging the two occurrences of the L-rule, i.e., exchanging the order of reduction of x and y, and then pushing the right-rules to the root of the deriva- The rst is not an intuitionistic -term because the -abstraction over A is not a weakening term, and yet the occurrence of ] is not a weakening occurrence. The second one is an intuitionistic -term because there are no names (in fact, it is the uniform derivation in the single-conclusioned calculus LJ).
Note that both derivations are not only uniform but are also resolution derivations. This implies that the second premiss in the L-rule is always an axiom. However both premisses of the L rule are important for determining when a resolution derivation is intuitionistic. The reason is that the choice of the axiom at the right premiss matters. This is not the case for single-conclusioned intuitionistic resolutions.
A description of the e ects of exchanging two L-rules requires an operational characterization of the normal form of a -term, which is given in the following de nition. Proof. Induction over the structure of A. Now we describe the exchange in detail. Consider Figures 2 and 3 . The former is intended to be a classically valid uniform derivation. The latter is intended to be an intuitionistically valid uniform derivation obtained from the former by permuting L rules with respect to one another and by inserting any right-rules so induced. 
Conclusions
We have presented a characterization of provability in propositional intuitionistic logic in terms of the -calculus | a variant of Parigot'scalculus. This calculus provides a system of realizers for the (cut-free) classical sequent calculus. Moreover, we have formulated a condition on the realizers for when a classical derivation yields su cient evidence to judge the provability of the endsequent in intuitionistic logic.
The characterization allows us to obtain search procedures for intuitionistic logic from search procedures for classical logic. We have exploited this by showing how an analytic resolution procedure for intuitionistically provable hereditary Harrop formulae can be obtained from a proof procedure constructing classical multiple-conclusioned uniform proofs. The combinatorics of the classical calculus can then be used to compute realizers on which the test for intuitionistic provability can be performed.
One direction for further work is add quanti ers, where we encounter a variety of familiar issues (cf. 34, 26] A second direction concerns applications. One promising line is to analyse the intuitionistic force of standard classical proof procedures such as various resolution methods, model elimination and tableaux methods, by representing these procedures as methods for constructing classical proofobjects (i.e., -terms). The case of resolution has been explored in 29, 3] .
